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TEHRAN \u2013 In a commentary on its website, The National Interest says the long-time Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan resorted to both ploy and union with a group of Jihadists to overthrow the Assad regime in Syria.<\/p>\n
\u201cTo replace Assad\u2019s Alawite-led government and substitute it with Sunni rule, Erdogan has employed both subterfuge and an alliance with\u00a0a motley band of jihadis,\u201d \u00a0Robert Ellis, a Turkey analyst and commentator, wrote on The National Interest website.<\/p>\n
The following is the text of the commentary:<\/p>\n
Turkey is seen as the victor after the fall of Assad. Nonetheless, Ankara cannot ignore a Kurdish role in the post-war settlement.\u00a0<\/p>\n
Once upon a time, Turkey\u2019s then-prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, hosted Syria\u2019s president, Bashar al-Assad, for a\u00a0family holiday\u00a0in Turkey and planned a\u00a0Middle East Union\u00a0together\u00a0with\u00a0Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. But the Arab Spring changed all of that. Assad\u2019s government was toppled at the hands of an opposition led by\u00a0Hayat Tahrir al-Sham\u00a0(HTS) on December 8.\u00a0<\/p>\n
President Erdogan\u00a0declared\u00a0he would soon pray in the Ummayad mosque in Damascus. This, however, has\u00a0taken longer than he expected. To replace Assad\u2019s Alawite-led government and substitute it with Sunni rule, Erdogan has employed both subterfuge and an alliance with\u00a0a motley band of jihadis, The National Interest said in a commentary.\u00a0<\/p>\n
In a gaffe at\u00a0Harvard University in 2014, then-Vice President Joe Biden, in a Q&A, stated that America\u2019s allies in the region, Turkey, the Saudis, and the Emirates, were the largest problem in Syria.\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u201cThey were so determined to take down Assad, and essentially have a proxy Sunni-Shia war, what did they do? They poured hundreds of millions of dollars and tens of tons of weapons into anyone who would fight against Assad\u2014except that the people who were being supplied, were al-Nusra and al-Qaeda, and the extremist elements of jihadis who were coming from other parts of the world.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>\n
Turkey\u2019s perpetual problem has been with Kurdish nationalism, ranging from the\u00a0Sheikh Said rebellion\u00a0in 1925 to the so-called \u201cdirty war\u201d with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party). This still resonates today with the weekly demonstrations by the \u201cSaturday mothers,\u201d demanding to learn the whereabouts of their loved ones.\u00a0<\/p>\n
Ironically, it was Erdogan who was the first Turkish leader\u00a0to admit\u00a0Turkey had a Kurdish problem, which led to\u00a0the Oslo talks\u00a0and a two-year ceasefire until 2015. However, in\u00a0a bait-and-switch deal, in July 2015, Erdogan offered Obama the Incirlik air base in return for what amounted to a free hand against the Kurds.\u00a0<\/p>\n
A second peace process\u00a0has been initiated by the governing AKP\u2019s (Justice and Development Party) partner, the MHP (National Movement Party), but this has been handicapped by\u00a0the removal of legally elected Kurdish mayors\u00a0and\u00a0the humanitarian disaster\u00a0caused by Turkish airstrikes on Kurdish-held northeast Syria.\u00a0<\/p>\n
Francesco Siccardi\u2019s\u00a0analysis clearly demonstrates the role of Syria in Turkey\u2019s foreign policy. The author contends that Turkey\u2019s policy in Syria is driven by domestic politics and the need to secure electoral support through an aggressive, nationalistic foreign policy.\u00a0<\/p>\n
Turkey\u2019s intervention and actual occupation of areas of Syria is marked by three cross-border operations in August 2016 (\u201cEuphrates Shield\u201d), in January 2018 (\u201cOlive Branch\u201d) and October 2019 (\u201cPeace Spring\u201d), and internally in Idlib in February 2020 (\u201cSpring Shield\u201d). The latter provided a jumping-off point for HTS\u2019s successful campaign.\u00a0<\/p>\n
The first was a\u00a0rebuff\u00a0to the United States, as the operation was launched the same day as Joe Biden touched down in Ankara to reassure Turkey of American support after the attempted coup in July 2016.\u00a0<\/p>\n
Olive Branch led to the occupation of Afrin, a Kurdish enclave in northwest Syria, and Peace Spring was an incursion into northeast Syria, another rebuff to U.S. support for the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in\u00a0the war against ISIS.\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u201cNow, there are only two leaders in the world. They are myself and Vladimir Putin,\u201d Erdogan says<\/cite><\/strong><\/p>\n Turkey\u2019s\u00a0control and administration\u00a0of areas of northern Syria makes a mockery of\u00a0Turkey\u2019s support for the preservation\u00a0of Syria\u2019s territorial integrity.\u00a0<\/p>\n In his analysis, Francesco Siccardi mentions the strategic realignment between Turkey and Russia that has helped both countries pursue their respective objectives in Syria: the survival of the Syrian leader\u2019s government for Moscow and the weakening of the Syrian Kurds for Ankara.<\/p>\n After Assad\u2019s flight, Moscow\u2019s hand has weakened, and\u00a0there are signs of withdrawal, although it maintains control of the Khmeimim air base and its naval base at Tartus for now. Turkey, however,\u00a0is touted\u00a0as the outside power with the most substantial hand in steering Syria\u2019s political transition. Erdogan has gone so far as to\u00a0claim, \u201cNow, there are only two leaders in the world. They are myself and Vladimir Putin.\u201d<\/p>\n Turkey is adamantly opposed to the Syrian Kurds playing any role in shaping their country\u2019s future, which flies against the fact they make up some\u00a010 percent\u00a0of the population and\u00a0occupy a large area\u00a0of the country.\u00a0<\/p>\n Turkey also has a vested interest in the return of\u00a0the four million Syrian refugees\u00a0that Turkey, with European support, has hosted since 2011.\u00a0<\/p>\n An interim Syrian government\u00a0has formed. Yet, given\u00a0the influence of HTS, there is concern about its direction.\u00a0<\/p>\n In January 2017, Russia, Turkey, and Iran convened\u00a0a meeting in Astana\u00a0in an attempt to end the six-year conflict in Syria. The meeting was attended not only by the Syrian government but also by the Syrian opposition and a UN envoy.\u00a0<\/p>\n Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov proposed\u00a0a draft constitution\u00a0for a settlement, which the Syrian opposition\u00a0rejected. Nevertheless, it contains\u00a0elements\u00a0that could provide a basis for a resolution. For example, it proposed dropping the \u201cArab\u201d from the country\u2019s official name, the \u201cSyrian Arab Republic,\u201d and rejecting Islamic sharia as the basis for law. It also recognized Kurdish cultural autonomy and the equal use of Arabic and Kurdish in this respect.<\/p>\n As Syria\u2019s new government has an acute need for international support, not least financially, the Russian draft merits further study.\u00a0<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n