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Sazandegi assessed China\u2019s refusal to join the G20 statement. The meeting was supposed to focus mainly on economic issues, but disagreements over the Strait of Hormuz once again exposed geopolitical rifts among major powers. The G20 countries emphasized the need for safe and free navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, but China declined to endorse the position.<\/p>\n
Beijing\u2019s objection cannot be reduced to a dispute over the strait\u2019s current situation. One major reason is China\u2019s concern about creating a legal and political precedent that might later be used against it. Alongside this legal concern, China\u2019s relationship with Iran carries special weight in Beijing\u2019s calculations. As one of the world\u2019s largest energy importers, China does not want to sacrifice its economic and political ties with Tehran for a framework shaped by Washington. China\u2019s stance at the G20 shows that even under increased US pressure on Iran, Washington faces serious obstacles in forming a global consensus on Hormuz security.<\/p>\n
Shargh: Jordan under pressure<\/strong><\/p>\n Shargh analyzed Jordan\u2019s difficult current situation, writing that Iran\u2019s repeated attacks on US military facilities in Jordan reveal something deeper than a mere defensive weakness: the gap between the Jordanian government\u2019s security dependence on Washington and a public angered by the Gaza war could turn Jordan into the most sensitive link in America\u2019s regional presence. Iran\u2019s multiple attacks have once again placed Jordan at the center of one of the Middle East\u2019s most delicate security equations. The recent attacks show that what appears from the outside to be a stable partnership is internally burdened with rising political costs. Many Jordanians see the US military presence not as a shield against regional crises but as a factor dragging their country into Washington\u2019s conflict with Tehran.<\/p>\n Ham\u2011Mihan: Israel opposes any understanding between Tehran and Washington<\/strong><\/p>\n Ham\u2011Mihan interviewed Javid Ghorban\u2011Oghli, a senior Middle East analyst, about Trump\u2019s failure to uphold the Islamabad memorandum. Returning to the memorandum is necessary for both Iran and the United States. However, it is clear that Israel and its powerful domestic lobby oppose any agreement between Iran and the US or any negotiated exit from the war. For Netanyahu, an Iran\u2013US agreement would amount to political death. Given Trump\u2019s narcissistic personality, Netanyahu\u2019s team currently dominates US policy. Therefore, Iran must adopt a strategy that deepens existing rifts between Tel Aviv and Washington and deprives Israel of the ability to push for military adventurism. Everyone knows Israel cannot sustain even a week of war with Iran without US support. The memorandum of understanding was a major political\u2011diplomatic gain for Iran. In other words, the significant concessions it granted Iran reflect the inability of the opposing side (the U.S. and Israel) to achieve their projected military objectives in the war.<\/p>\n Arman\u2011e-Melli: Keeping the oil route<\/strong><\/p>\n Arman\u2011e-Melli highlighted the importance of maintaining relations with China, especially in the oil sector. The paper wrote that securing China\u2019s support does not necessarily mean aligning political slogans; rather, it means reducing the costs created by each side\u2019s behavior. If China is convinced that Iran guarantees the security of China\u2019s oil flow\u2014and China, in turn, ensures that this flow is not targeted by sanctions or blockades\u2014then a genuine exchange of power emerges. If supplying China\u2019s oil is seen as one of the most important pillars of bilateral relations, one can imagine a solution in which China gains direct interests in designing and maintaining the oil\u2011transfer chain from Iran to its destination. Iran can ask China to place its power behind the oil flow, but in return, Iran must make protecting that flow more beneficial for China than abandoning it. Thus, the Iran\u2013China strategic partnership can be turned into a practical, measurable mechanism rather than a mere political phrase.<\/p>\n Hamshahri: America\u2019s economic\u2013operational crisis<\/strong><\/p>\n The war has shown that the issue of cost is not limited to the price of each missile. To counter Iran\u2019s missile and drone attacks, the US has sometimes had to use multiple interceptors against a single threat. This creates both economic and operational problems: multimillion\u2011dollar interceptors are being used against threats that are often far cheaper. Thus, the more Iran can increase the volume of its attacks, the greater the pressure on America\u2019s air\u2011defense stockpiles. US strikes near the Strait of Hormuz and Iran\u2019s missile attacks on US positions in Jordan have revived the question of how much Washington can escalate its operations. The most important consequence of this crisis for Washington may not appear on Iran\u2019s battlefield but in the calculations of China and America\u2019s East Asia allies. If Beijing concludes that a prolonged Middle East conflict could drain US stockpiles and limit Washington\u2019s ability to respond in the Pacific, the ammunition crisis could shift from a logistical problem to a strategic variable.
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