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The proposal of the possibility of America using unconventional weapons, including nuclear weapons, against Iran’s underground facilities has once again raised the question of whether Washington’s military power, even at its highest level, can lead to Iran’s strategic defeat. An examination of the dimensions of this issue shows that there is a fundamental difference between the ability to inflict widespread damage on a country’s infrastructure and the ability to eliminate its national, scientific, political, and defense capacities; a difference that has a determining importance in America’s military calculations regarding Iran.<\/p>\n
In recent days, some media outlets have speculated about the possibility of America using unconventional weapons in any possible new confrontation with Iran. In this connection, the Middle East Monitor news website, in a report, has examined the possibility of using nuclear weapons against Iran’s underground facilities and emphasized that even such an action will not be a guarantee of Iran’s surrender or of Washington achieving its strategic objectives.<\/p>\n
The importance of this discussion lies not merely in examining an extreme military scenario; rather, it must be seen as a sign of the limitations of America’s military power in facing a country whose important part of its capabilities is not summarized in a geographical point or a set of identifiable facilities.<\/p>\n
The First Limitation; Knowledge Cannot Be Bombed<\/strong><\/p>\n One of the most important differences between Iran’s nuclear program and a set of merely infrastructural targets is its knowledge-based nature. Physical facilities, equipment, and buildings may be damaged or even destroyed during a military operation; but technical knowledge, accumulated experience, specialized human resources, and the ability to reproduce technology cannot be eliminated so easily.<\/p>\n Iran’s nuclear program has been formed and developed over several decades. This program does not rely merely on a few buildings or a set of equipment; rather, it is the product of the formation of a network of specialists, scientific centers, operational experiences, and industrial capacities. For this reason, even inflicting heavy damage on existing facilities will not necessarily mean ending the country’s scientific and technological capacity.<\/p>\n This issue also applies to other strategic areas of Iran. The country’s defense, industrial, and technological capabilities have been developed over the years, and part of it has turned into knowledge and experience that the destruction of physical infrastructure alone cannot eliminate.<\/p>\n In fact, one of the fundamental limitations of strategies based on infrastructural destruction is that they imagine that by destroying existing tools, the capacity to produce and rebuild those tools can also be destroyed; while the two are not necessarily the same.<\/p>\n From the Destruction of Facilities to Strategic Defeat; A Determining Gap<\/strong><\/p>\n The second issue is the difference between operational victory and strategic victory. The US military possesses a high ability to carry out long-range operations, use advanced weapons, and inflict damage on specific targets. However, success in destroying military targets does not in itself mean the realization of the political objectives of an operation.<\/p>\n The ultimate goal of any military strategy is not merely the destruction of the opposing side’s equipment and infrastructure; rather, it must create conditions in which the opposing side abandons the continuation of its policy or is forced to accept the aggressor side’s demands. This is precisely the point at which military calculations collide with political and social realities.<\/p>\n Even if America can inflict widespread damage on Iran’s facilities, it will still face fundamental questions: Will these damages lead to a change in Tehran’s political calculations? Will the country’s scientific and industrial capacities be eliminated? Will Iran not have the ability to rebuild and continue its path? And most importantly, can the use of military power break the political will of a country?<\/p>\n The answers to these questions cannot be determined merely by calculating the explosive power of weapons or the extent of destruction of targets. Historical experience has also shown that military superiority does not necessarily mean the ability to impose political will.<\/p>\n Nuclear Weapons; Crossing a Red Line with Unpredictable Consequences<\/strong><\/p>\n The third point is the political and international consequences of America’s possible use of nuclear weapons. Such an action, even if carried out with the aim of destroying Iran’s underground facilities, will not be merely a military operation against a country; rather, it can turn into a crisis at the regional and international level.<\/p>\n Over the past decades, America has always tried to present itself as a defender of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and to place Iran’s nuclear program within the framework of concerns related to nuclear proliferation. The use of nuclear weapons against Iran will confront this claim with a serious contradiction.<\/p>\n In such circumstances, Washington will not only face widespread international criticism, but will also severely weaken its political and moral credibility on the issue of non-proliferation. How can one speak of the necessity of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, but oneself use these weapons to resolve a political and security dispute?<\/p>\n In addition, the use of nuclear weapons can weaken the normative threshold prohibiting the use of these weapons and increase various countries’ concern about their own security and the credibility of great powers’ commitments. Such an event may also change the security calculations of other governments and strengthen the incentive to review defense and nuclear policies.<\/p>\n The Region’s Geography; A Cost Beyond Iran’s Borders<\/strong><\/p>\n The possible consequences of the use of unconventional weapons will not be limited to Iran’s borders. Iran’s geographical position and its economic, environmental, and security ties with neighboring countries cause any use of nuclear weapons to create risks beyond the area of the military target.<\/p>\n Radioactive contamination, depending on the type of weapon, the conditions of the explosion, and atmospheric and geographical factors, can have widespread human and environmental effects. These consequences may also affect neighboring countries, water resources, agricultural activities, and the region’s environment.<\/p>\n On the other hand, such an action can create a wave of political and security instability in the region. Under conditions in which West Asia faces numerous crises, the expansion of a confrontation to the level of the use of nuclear weapons will make it extremely difficult to contain its consequences.<\/p>\n Therefore, the cost of such a decision is not limited to the extent of damage inflicted on Iran; rather, the security of America’s regional allies, this country’s economic interests, and the stability of strategic trade and energy routes may also face serious risks.<\/p>\n The Main Issue; Destructive Power Is Not the Same as the Power of Victory<\/strong><\/p>\n Ultimately, the discussion about the possibility of America using unconventional weapons against Iran must be examined within the framework of a fundamental reality: military power, although it can change field equations, is alone incapable of determining all the political and strategic results of a confrontation.<\/p>\n America may possess the ability to inflict heavy damage on Iran’s infrastructure; but this ability is different from the destruction of a country’s knowledge, political will, capacity to rebuild, and national power. Even the use of weapons with unprecedented destructive power cannot guarantee the political result Washington wants.<\/p>\n From this perspective, the proposal of the possibility of using nuclear weapons must be seen not as a definitive sign of America’s absolute superiority and power, but as a warning about the limitations of conventional tools and the difficulty of achieving strategic objectives against Iran.<\/p>\n The issue is not how much destructive power America possesses; the issue is whether it can, by relying on this power, impose its desired political result on Iran. The answer to this question is far more complex than calculations related to the power of weapons. The destruction of a facility, even if widespread and unprecedented, does not mean the defeat of a country; just as superiority on the military battlefield does not necessarily bring victory in the arena of politics.<\/p>\n MNA\u00a0<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n